SF Soldiers KIA in Niger
- Thread starter Gunz
- Start date
I'm tired of people calling me xenophobic just because I disagree with their policies - oh wait, that's bleed over from another thread...
But I mean, illegal alien with a superior intellect, technology, and a condescending manner yet seeming to pander to the working man? Kazoo has got have a metaphorical connection somewhere...
Topkick
Verified Military
The beret sucks. It looks better than the cunt cap, except when knuckleheads can't form the beret correctly. Then it looks like a complete clusterfuck.
ETA: I am done ranting about the beret. I got off the thread topic.
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Could've been comm problems. And maybe in the confusion they didn't realize just how far up shit alley they actually were until things got really hairy really fast. What troubles me is that they split up. One element retreated and left the other. I'm wondering if the indigs panicked. (That's what it sounds like to me). If that happened, the SF advisors with that counterpart element would've had to move with them while attempting to steady them and rally them...and would've been drawn away from the four Americans in the village.
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So this story....ugh.
U.S. Forces in Niger Were Denied Armed Drone
I know that not everyone has subscription to WSJ; so I am posting most of it here.
U.S. military officials sought permission to send an armed drone near a patrol of Green Berets before a deadly ambush Oct. 4 in Niger, but the request was blocked, raising questions about whether those forces had adequate protection against the dangers of their mission.
New information shows the Green Beret team was part of a larger mission, one potentially more dangerous than initially described, and one believed to merit an armed drone. But the request was blocked in a chain of approval that snakes through the Pentagon, State Department and the Nigerien government, according to officials briefed on the events.
One focus of military investigations into what happened in Niger will be what a military official now says were two changes in the mission of the Green Beret team—from initially training Nigerien forces, to advising on a mission to capture or kill a wanted terrorist, to investigating the terrorist’s abandoned camp.
On Oct. 4, after the U.S.-Nigerien team had destroyed the camp, four Americans and five Nigerien soldiers were killed in a firefight with suspected Islamic State fighters, and two other Americans and as many as eight Nigeriens were wounded.
The ambush and the circumstances surrounding it have taken on political weight in Washington as the deadliest military clash for Americans since President Donald Trump took office. Sen. John McCain (R., Ariz.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has pressed for more information, and a public spat broke out about condolence calls by Mr. Trump.
The drone request suggests that military officials were aware of a change in the security landscape in western Niger, where more than two dozen previous patrols had been conducted without incident. Intelligence indicated a low risk of enemy contact, and there had been no enemy attacks on U.S. forces there for the past year, according to officials investigating the incident.
The initial decision against the use of an armed drone reflects an effort by the U.S. mission in Niger to maintain a light footprint in the country amid local resistance to the deployment of armed aircraft—a challenge for officials also seeking to adequately support U.S. troops there.
After the firefight broke out on Oct. 4, some military officials also wanted an armed drone, but it is unclear if one was in the area and whether any request was made, according to a military official. An unarmed drone was dispatched, and French Mirage jet fighters arrived about an hour later, followed by French helicopters.
U.S. officials have repeatedly modified the timeline as facts trickle in.
The Green Beret patrol was one of two operating in the area at about the same time, Pentagon officials said. The second consisted of an elite commando team specializing in missions to track down wanted jihadists; both were involved at the time in a hunt for an associate of Adnan abu Walid al-Sahawi, the leader of Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, according to current and former officials briefed on the events.
The targeted militant was operating in the border region, moving between Niger and Mali, and the elite team was also operating on both sides of the border, officials said. The jihadist is an important figure in Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, an organization operating in the two countries, according to a person briefed on the investigation.
The Green Beret team’s role in Niger was initially to help train the country’s security forces. But then, before the October mission began, the group was asked to advise the Nigerien quick-reaction force that was to assist the elite commando unit on its mission to capture or kill the terrorist target, according to a military official.
That mission was scrubbed because weather conditions increased the risk for helicopter flight to the site where the jihadist was thought to be, the official said.
The commando unit then sought another U.S. team to check out what appeared to be an abandoned terror camp that the jihadist had used, according to current and former officials briefed on the events.
The Green Beret patrol, now available to be retasked, was sent to the camp, the officials said.
The patrol was made up mostly of Green Berets, with other soldiers attached. All were considered well trained, having gone through the comprehensive work-ups of the elite Special Forces, according to Pentagon records. But their experience levels varied, according to the records; at least one had never deployed and at least four hadn’t seen combat.
The team, along with 30 Nigerien troops, left the country’s capital, Niamey, the morning of Oct. 3.
The new mission, to find the abandoned camp and shelter, was considered relatively low-risk. An assessment showed there was little likelihood of an enemy attack, officials have said, after the wanted terrorist was known to have abandoned the camp.
Military investigators have been examining the official orders that led to the assignment. A key unanswered question is who formally changed the Green Beret-led team’s mission—the U.S. Africa Command, known as Africom, the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command, or another agency.
Investigators also are working to find out if there was adequate intelligence to evaluate the likelihood of enemy contact and whether the team was prepared for helping an elite commando team track and kill Mr. Sahawi’s associate.
Investigations into the ambush by military officials, aided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, are likely to take weeks, according to officials briefed on the inquiry.
Mr. Sahawi is considered a top target in the “tri-border” region of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, according to European officials. The area is made up in large part of wildlife preserves, allowing militants, often in groups of just a few dozen, to move across borders, hide out and strike as needed.
The joint U.S.-Nigerien team relatively quickly located and arrived at the camp that had been abandoned by Mr. Sahawi’s lieutenant. The team, according to military reports, collected some information and destroyed the shelter they found, though military officials don’t know if it was a regular camp or had only been used once.
From there, late on Oct. 3, the team began the trek back to their base camp, according to a military official.
Based on the reports submitted by the Green Berets after they left the abandoned terrorist camp, the team hiked throughout the night of Oct. 3 to Oct. 4, never staying in one place for more than a couple of hours.
While on the route back to their camp, in the morning of Oct. 4, the Nigerien forces asked to stop at a village to get breakfast and refill their canteens.
When U.S. forces visit a village, it is standard procedure to meet with the elder, explain their broader mission and enlist a measure of support from the local population.
That meeting went longer than expected. At 10:40 a.m. local time, minutes after leaving the village, the troops were ambushed.
Investigators are probing the question of how the jihadists found the Green Berets, since intelligence hadn’t documented any militants operating in the area of the village.
The length of the village meeting has caused some military officials to question whether villagers tried to delay the Green Berets. But military officials said they now believe the village elder wasn’t involved.
Military officials don’t know if the fighters who ambushed the Green Beret-led team were affiliated with the terrorist being hunted by the elite team.
One official noted that the areas were far apart, and the Green Beret team had taken steps to avoid being tracked. Other officials believe he was likely responsible for the attack.
An hour into the fight, minutes after a request from the team for air support, the unarmed drone arrived, allowing more senior military commanders to watch the firefight.
The French Mirage jet fighters from an airfield in Niamey were underway within a half-hour and in the area 30 minutes later, the Pentagon said. French helicopters left from Mali, officials said.
During the fight, four soldiers became separated from the rest of the team. Those soldiers would be the Americans killed.
Late on the afternoon of Oct. 4, French helicopters evacuated two wounded U.S. soldiers. It wasn’t until that evening that the bodies of three of the four U.S. soldiers killed were evacuated.
The body of the fourth soldier, Sgt. La David Johnson, was still missing. He was found two days later by Nigerien forces.
Military officials declined to say why the initial request for an armed drone was made. The U.S. Africa Command, which is responsible for military operations for most of the continent, typically must request permission from the U.S. ambassador or the chief of mission at a U.S. embassy in a given country for any military operation, according to current and former officials briefed on the events.
If the ambassador blocks the mission, the decision can be appealed by military officials to the Pentagon.
That step typically requires a discussion between the secretaries of Defense and State. Military officials said top officers are reluctant to take disputes with an ambassador to the secretary of Defense, out of concern of sending a signal that the command isn’t able to work effectively with its diplomatic partners. No high-level discussion in advance of the Green Beret patrol that began Oct. 3 appears to have taken place.
State Department officials denied that their teams in Africa can block military requests for drone flights or strikes and said diplomats didn’t stop a request for an armed drone in Niger.
“The U.S. ambassador in Niger did not deny support or protection for military personnel involved in the October 4 ambush,” State Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert said. “The ambassador supported all efforts to ensure the safety of our military colleagues in the field.”
One of the officials briefed on the events said sensitivities in Niger concerning the use of armed drones have delayed their use. The two countries signed an agreement in 2013 allowing Washington to establish a drone base there. The $100 million base is set to be completed next year.
U.S. Forces in Niger Were Denied Armed Drone
I know that not everyone has subscription to WSJ; so I am posting most of it here.
U.S. military officials sought permission to send an armed drone near a patrol of Green Berets before a deadly ambush Oct. 4 in Niger, but the request was blocked, raising questions about whether those forces had adequate protection against the dangers of their mission.
New information shows the Green Beret team was part of a larger mission, one potentially more dangerous than initially described, and one believed to merit an armed drone. But the request was blocked in a chain of approval that snakes through the Pentagon, State Department and the Nigerien government, according to officials briefed on the events.
One focus of military investigations into what happened in Niger will be what a military official now says were two changes in the mission of the Green Beret team—from initially training Nigerien forces, to advising on a mission to capture or kill a wanted terrorist, to investigating the terrorist’s abandoned camp.
On Oct. 4, after the U.S.-Nigerien team had destroyed the camp, four Americans and five Nigerien soldiers were killed in a firefight with suspected Islamic State fighters, and two other Americans and as many as eight Nigeriens were wounded.
The ambush and the circumstances surrounding it have taken on political weight in Washington as the deadliest military clash for Americans since President Donald Trump took office. Sen. John McCain (R., Ariz.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has pressed for more information, and a public spat broke out about condolence calls by Mr. Trump.
The drone request suggests that military officials were aware of a change in the security landscape in western Niger, where more than two dozen previous patrols had been conducted without incident. Intelligence indicated a low risk of enemy contact, and there had been no enemy attacks on U.S. forces there for the past year, according to officials investigating the incident.
The initial decision against the use of an armed drone reflects an effort by the U.S. mission in Niger to maintain a light footprint in the country amid local resistance to the deployment of armed aircraft—a challenge for officials also seeking to adequately support U.S. troops there.
After the firefight broke out on Oct. 4, some military officials also wanted an armed drone, but it is unclear if one was in the area and whether any request was made, according to a military official. An unarmed drone was dispatched, and French Mirage jet fighters arrived about an hour later, followed by French helicopters.
U.S. officials have repeatedly modified the timeline as facts trickle in.
The Green Beret patrol was one of two operating in the area at about the same time, Pentagon officials said. The second consisted of an elite commando team specializing in missions to track down wanted jihadists; both were involved at the time in a hunt for an associate of Adnan abu Walid al-Sahawi, the leader of Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, according to current and former officials briefed on the events.
The targeted militant was operating in the border region, moving between Niger and Mali, and the elite team was also operating on both sides of the border, officials said. The jihadist is an important figure in Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, an organization operating in the two countries, according to a person briefed on the investigation.
The Green Beret team’s role in Niger was initially to help train the country’s security forces. But then, before the October mission began, the group was asked to advise the Nigerien quick-reaction force that was to assist the elite commando unit on its mission to capture or kill the terrorist target, according to a military official.
That mission was scrubbed because weather conditions increased the risk for helicopter flight to the site where the jihadist was thought to be, the official said.
The commando unit then sought another U.S. team to check out what appeared to be an abandoned terror camp that the jihadist had used, according to current and former officials briefed on the events.
The Green Beret patrol, now available to be retasked, was sent to the camp, the officials said.
The patrol was made up mostly of Green Berets, with other soldiers attached. All were considered well trained, having gone through the comprehensive work-ups of the elite Special Forces, according to Pentagon records. But their experience levels varied, according to the records; at least one had never deployed and at least four hadn’t seen combat.
The team, along with 30 Nigerien troops, left the country’s capital, Niamey, the morning of Oct. 3.
The new mission, to find the abandoned camp and shelter, was considered relatively low-risk. An assessment showed there was little likelihood of an enemy attack, officials have said, after the wanted terrorist was known to have abandoned the camp.
Military investigators have been examining the official orders that led to the assignment. A key unanswered question is who formally changed the Green Beret-led team’s mission—the U.S. Africa Command, known as Africom, the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command, or another agency.
Investigators also are working to find out if there was adequate intelligence to evaluate the likelihood of enemy contact and whether the team was prepared for helping an elite commando team track and kill Mr. Sahawi’s associate.
Investigations into the ambush by military officials, aided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, are likely to take weeks, according to officials briefed on the inquiry.
Mr. Sahawi is considered a top target in the “tri-border” region of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, according to European officials. The area is made up in large part of wildlife preserves, allowing militants, often in groups of just a few dozen, to move across borders, hide out and strike as needed.
The joint U.S.-Nigerien team relatively quickly located and arrived at the camp that had been abandoned by Mr. Sahawi’s lieutenant. The team, according to military reports, collected some information and destroyed the shelter they found, though military officials don’t know if it was a regular camp or had only been used once.
From there, late on Oct. 3, the team began the trek back to their base camp, according to a military official.
Based on the reports submitted by the Green Berets after they left the abandoned terrorist camp, the team hiked throughout the night of Oct. 3 to Oct. 4, never staying in one place for more than a couple of hours.
While on the route back to their camp, in the morning of Oct. 4, the Nigerien forces asked to stop at a village to get breakfast and refill their canteens.
When U.S. forces visit a village, it is standard procedure to meet with the elder, explain their broader mission and enlist a measure of support from the local population.
That meeting went longer than expected. At 10:40 a.m. local time, minutes after leaving the village, the troops were ambushed.
Investigators are probing the question of how the jihadists found the Green Berets, since intelligence hadn’t documented any militants operating in the area of the village.
The length of the village meeting has caused some military officials to question whether villagers tried to delay the Green Berets. But military officials said they now believe the village elder wasn’t involved.
Military officials don’t know if the fighters who ambushed the Green Beret-led team were affiliated with the terrorist being hunted by the elite team.
One official noted that the areas were far apart, and the Green Beret team had taken steps to avoid being tracked. Other officials believe he was likely responsible for the attack.
An hour into the fight, minutes after a request from the team for air support, the unarmed drone arrived, allowing more senior military commanders to watch the firefight.
The French Mirage jet fighters from an airfield in Niamey were underway within a half-hour and in the area 30 minutes later, the Pentagon said. French helicopters left from Mali, officials said.
During the fight, four soldiers became separated from the rest of the team. Those soldiers would be the Americans killed.
Late on the afternoon of Oct. 4, French helicopters evacuated two wounded U.S. soldiers. It wasn’t until that evening that the bodies of three of the four U.S. soldiers killed were evacuated.
The body of the fourth soldier, Sgt. La David Johnson, was still missing. He was found two days later by Nigerien forces.
Military officials declined to say why the initial request for an armed drone was made. The U.S. Africa Command, which is responsible for military operations for most of the continent, typically must request permission from the U.S. ambassador or the chief of mission at a U.S. embassy in a given country for any military operation, according to current and former officials briefed on the events.
If the ambassador blocks the mission, the decision can be appealed by military officials to the Pentagon.
That step typically requires a discussion between the secretaries of Defense and State. Military officials said top officers are reluctant to take disputes with an ambassador to the secretary of Defense, out of concern of sending a signal that the command isn’t able to work effectively with its diplomatic partners. No high-level discussion in advance of the Green Beret patrol that began Oct. 3 appears to have taken place.
State Department officials denied that their teams in Africa can block military requests for drone flights or strikes and said diplomats didn’t stop a request for an armed drone in Niger.
“The U.S. ambassador in Niger did not deny support or protection for military personnel involved in the October 4 ambush,” State Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert said. “The ambassador supported all efforts to ensure the safety of our military colleagues in the field.”
One of the officials briefed on the events said sensitivities in Niger concerning the use of armed drones have delayed their use. The two countries signed an agreement in 2013 allowing Washington to establish a drone base there. The $100 million base is set to be completed next year.
From NYT article above:
"The initial decision against the use of an armed drone reflects an effort by the U.S. mission in Niger to maintain a light footprint in the country amid local resistance to the deployment of armed aircraft.."
Mogadishu, Benghazi, now this. Fuck your light footprint, fuck your fear of escalation, fuck local resistance. There's a reason the locals don't want armed aircraft in the AO...because armed aircraft represent a threat to their goddam terrorist operations.
"The initial decision against the use of an armed drone reflects an effort by the U.S. mission in Niger to maintain a light footprint in the country amid local resistance to the deployment of armed aircraft.."
Mogadishu, Benghazi, now this. Fuck your light footprint, fuck your fear of escalation, fuck local resistance. There's a reason the locals don't want armed aircraft in the AO...because armed aircraft represent a threat to their goddam terrorist operations.
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This story....sigh....
Green Beret died trying to save comrades in deadly ambush | Daily Mail Online
On Friday, a US official gave the fullest account yet of how the attack, which has been shrouded in secrecy and described murkily by US officials in Washington, played out.
They revealed that;
Green Beret died trying to save comrades in deadly ambush | Daily Mail Online
On Friday, a US official gave the fullest account yet of how the attack, which has been shrouded in secrecy and described murkily by US officials in Washington, played out.
They revealed that;
- Sgt. Johnson was in an armed pick-up truck that was in front of the vehicle carrying the other three men when the attack began
- He and others in the truck initially got out to return fire but got back into the vehicles when they realised they were dangerously outnumbered
- They sped ahead 200 yards then realized the other men, who were in an unarmed Land Cruiser, were behind and in the kill zone
- Two other US soldiers got out of the truck on foot and marched back towards the Cruiser while Johnson covered them from a mounted machine gun on the pick-up truck
- The cruiser was hit by a mortar and all three inside the vehicle were killed
- Johnson's pick-up truck was also hit and it's likely his body was thrown from it as it bounded along the ground
- For two hours after the first call for back-up was made, surviving soldiers were under fire from the militants
- When French fighter jets arrived and scared them off, the surviving US and Nigerien soldiers were back-to-back, still firing shots
- Sgt. Johnson's body was only discovered on October 6 when a village elder, who previously stalled them from leaving Tongo Tongo, revealed where it was to Nigerien forces
- The men were due to have back-up for the doomed mission but the unit which was supposed to accompany them was unable to at the last minute
- Instead of being called back to base, they were told to proceed
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Okay so you didn't do anything wrong necessarily, but consider this. There are members of this board who may have very personal connections to the men involved in this story. At 16 years old you don't really have a lot to add to this thread, and the detail you wrote out can be found in the story if guys want to click the article...give them the option.
Thanks.
I clicked. Re Sgt Johnson RIP and no further comment or speculation.
From the article:
"A senior Nigerien security official said... that the military unit made a critical error by deciding to spend the night along the volatile Mali-Niger border. That allowed the militants to surveil the unit and plan the ambush that occurred the following morning outside Tongo Tongo as the team was heading back to their base, he said."
I don't know if the above is true or not...but one thing I know from experience. Stay in one place too long and the enemy has time to get in position to kill you. They already know where you are because sympathetic villagers will keep them informed of your movements. If you don't loiter and keep mobile, you make it harder for the enemy to get a good attack set-up. SF guys know this better than anybody, so I'd also assume the decision might not have been their's to make.
From the article:
"A senior Nigerien security official said... that the military unit made a critical error by deciding to spend the night along the volatile Mali-Niger border. That allowed the militants to surveil the unit and plan the ambush that occurred the following morning outside Tongo Tongo as the team was heading back to their base, he said."
I don't know if the above is true or not...but one thing I know from experience. Stay in one place too long and the enemy has time to get in position to kill you. They already know where you are because sympathetic villagers will keep them informed of your movements. If you don't loiter and keep mobile, you make it harder for the enemy to get a good attack set-up. SF guys know this better than anybody, so I'd also assume the decision might not have been their's to make.
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The snake is long. Seven miles. Driver, where you taking us?
My apologies. I wasn't sure if it was appropriate to just post a link. I recognize my error here. Thank you.
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- UPDATE -
This is the story we are going with on Sgt. Johnson.
US soldier ambushed in Niger wasn't captured
An American soldier killed in an ambush in Niger with three comrades but recovered days later wasn’t captured alive by the enemy or executed at close range, The Associated Press has learned, based on the conclusion of a military investigation. It found evidence he apparently fought to the end.
Dispelling a swirl of rumors about how Sgt. La David T. Johnson, 25, of Miami Gardens, Florida, died, the report has determined that he was killed by enemy rifle and machine gun fire as he fled the attack by an offshoot of the Islamic State group about 120 miles (200 kilometers) north of Niamey, the capital of the African country. The attack took place Oct. 4; Johnson’s body was recovered two days later.
This is the story we are going with on Sgt. Johnson.
US soldier ambushed in Niger wasn't captured
An American soldier killed in an ambush in Niger with three comrades but recovered days later wasn’t captured alive by the enemy or executed at close range, The Associated Press has learned, based on the conclusion of a military investigation. It found evidence he apparently fought to the end.
Dispelling a swirl of rumors about how Sgt. La David T. Johnson, 25, of Miami Gardens, Florida, died, the report has determined that he was killed by enemy rifle and machine gun fire as he fled the attack by an offshoot of the Islamic State group about 120 miles (200 kilometers) north of Niamey, the capital of the African country. The attack took place Oct. 4; Johnson’s body was recovered two days later.
Hopefully this can give his family a little closure.
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‘An Endless War’: Why 4 U.S. Soldiers Died in a Remote African Desert
A pretty sobering and detailed account of what happened the 4 men during the firefight, as the NYT have obtained the helmet cam footage from the camera worn by Staff Sgt Johnson.
A pretty sobering and detailed account of what happened the 4 men during the firefight, as the NYT have obtained the helmet cam footage from the camera worn by Staff Sgt Johnson.
Unfortunately, while it might bring some closure it's also a preview before the actual helmet cam release. As much as I hope there's only one copy and people in place can some stop the release, it's going to be released. That really sucks.
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Agreed. In fact I have not been able to make myself read the account that @Poccington posted yet. There is zero chance I would even consider watching a video of it.
Unfortunately it’s going to be released by the ISIS militants that took it originally. It’s interesting that the media was able to obtain a copy, I wonder how. You’d think American media outlets wouldn’t be contacting twitter accounts associated with ISIS affiliates. If they did get a copy, did they pay for it or exchange something? I would find it hard to believe that they could fall for “buying it to keep it off the web.” I ask generally because I don’t know..
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